Esperanto and Its Rivals: The Struggle for an International Language

An artificial language was the default solution. Artificial languages still aroused some misgivings, but the British Association regarded these misgivings as a product of linguistic chauvinism and questionable linguistic theories. According to the British Association, both Ido and Esperanto had proven to be practical solutions for international communication. There was one problem, which still had to be solved. Since there was room for only one language, Idists and Esperantists had to reach an agreement and put an end to the schism: "Unity is essential, and it would be lamentable if a project to unite the nations were to be shipwrecked by disunion within the ranks."13 But neither the Esperantist nor the Idist took notice. When the report was publicly discussed, both sides initiated such an embarrassing quarrel that the issue was finally dropped.14

Aside from the usual quarrels among rivals, technological factors might also help explain why Esperanto failed to be adopted as a lingua franca. If advances in transport and communications technologies had made the prob- lem of international communication more salient, later technological advances ameliorated this same problem. This was particularly the case in international meetings, where printed communication could not substitute for face-to- face interactions. Before simultaneous translation systems, a common arrange- ment in international meetings was to seat participants according to their lan- guage, let the speaker pronounce a few sentences, and have the interpreters stand up to simultaneously translate them into the languages of the audience, until the end of the speech. This was a clumsy process, and a living illustra- tion of the problem of Babel. The 1926 invention of the Filene-Finlay Speech Translator, first used by the International Labour Office and much popular- ized some years later at the Nuremberg Trials, was of great help in large in- ternational conferences. Only important international organizations could afford this technology, but these organizations or the governments that sup- ported them eventually framed the international communication problem and its solution.

Perhaps even more important than rivalries and technological advance- ments to explain Esperanto's failure was the popular idea among the Euro- pean elites that Esperanto was a threat to the international standing of nation-states (particularly for the most powerful ones) and national cohesion, a concern shared by both democratic and non-democratic countries. As men- tioned, the British Foreign Office was not up to supporting Esperanto "when we are seeking to secure the adoption of English as the second language in all foreign countries."15

Linguistic imperialism was more openly supported in France, as a reac- tion to the perceived decline of French. As early as the turn of the century, businessman Paul Chappellier had explained that Esperanto threatened the French nation and language, both internally and internationally. Internally, Esperanto could reinforce patois and regional identities, undermining French national consciousness and cohesion. Internationally, a widespread acceptance of Esperanto as a second language could only make the French language re- treat to within her "natural" borders, very much like a snail hides in its shell (comme le limagon dans sa coquille).16 To deal with the problem of interna- tional communication, and to halt the spread of Esperanto, Chappellier sug- gested a linguistic alliance between France, the United Kingdom, and the United States by which French would be compulsory in American and British schools and English in French schools. He hoped that the Germans would put aside their national sentiments and accept the economic advan- tages of his plan, although, in truth, he was not at all concerned about the Germans. As he plainly asserted, the plan would "lessen the concurrence of German and will annihilate that of English, since both French and English, instead of rivals, will become partners."17 Inevitably, the Chappellier Plan, as it was later called, caught the attention of conservative circles. As the public came closer to a new world war, the plan attracted more publicity. For example, Albert Dauzat, in La defense de la langue frangaise, enthusias- tically endorsed the plan as a bulwark against the no less menacing threat: Esperanto.18