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The Historians' History of the World 03 [Greece to the Peloponnesian War]
- Автор: Gutenberg
- Год: 1905
- Язык: английский
- Жанр: История
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Another expedient, which seems to have been tried not unfrequently in early times, for preserving or restoring tranquillity, was to invest an individual with absolute power, under a peculiar title, which soon became obsolete: that of æsymnete. At Cumæ indeed, and in other cities, this was the title of an ordinary magistracy, probably of that which succeeded the hereditary monarchy; but, when applied to an extraordinary office, it was equivalent to the title of protector or dictator. It did not indicate any disposition to revive the heroic royalty, but only the need which was felt, either by the commonalty of protection against the nobles, or by all parties of a temporary compromise, which induced the adverse factions to acquiesce in a neutral government. The office was conferred sometimes for life, sometimes only for a limited term, or for the accomplishment of a specific object, as the sage Pittacus was chosen by universal consent at Mytilene, when the city was threatened by a band of exiles, headed by the poet Alcæus and his brother Antimenidas [about 612 B.C.].
TYRANNIES
The fall of an oligarchy was sometimes accelerated by accidental and inevitable disasters, as by a protracted war, which at once exhausted its wealth and reduced its numbers, or by the loss of a battle, in which the flower of its youth might sometimes be cut off at one blow, and leave it to the mercy of its subjects; a case of which we shall find a signal instance in the history of Argos. But much more frequently the revolutions which overthrew the oligarchical governments arose out of the imprudence or misconduct, or the internal dissensions, of the ruling body, or out of the ambition of some of its members. The commonalty, even when really superior in strength, could not, all at once, shake off the awe with which it was impressed by ages of subjection. It needed a leader to animate, unite, and direct it.
Such was the origin of most of the governments which the Greeks described by the term “tyranny”—a term to which a notion has been attached, in modern languages, which did not enter into its original definition. A tyranny, in the Greek sense of the word, was the irresponsible dominion of a single person, not founded on hereditary right, like the monarchies of the heroic ages and of many barbarian nations; nor on a free election, like that of a dictator or æsymnete; but on force. It did not change its character when transmitted through several generations, nor was any other name invented to describe it when power which had been acquired by violence was used for the public good; though Aristotle makes it an element in the definition of tyranny, that it is exercised for selfish ends. But, according to the ordinary Greek notions, and the usage of the Greek historians, a mild and beneficent tyranny is an expression which involves no contradiction. On the other hand, a government, legitimate in its origin, might be converted into a tyranny, by an illegal forcible extension of its powers, or of its duration; and we are informed by Aristotle that this was frequently the case in early times, before the regal title was abolished, or while the chief magistrate, who succeeded under a different name to the functions of royalty, was still invested with prerogatives dangerous to liberty. Such was the basis on which one of the ancient tyrants, most infamous for his cruelty, Phalaris of Agrigentum [or Acragas], established his despotism.
But most of the tyrannies which sprang up before the Persian wars owed their existence to the cause above described, and derived their peculiar character from the occasion which gave them birth. It was usually by a mixture of violence and artifice that the demagogue accomplished his ends. A hackneyed stratagem, which however seems always to have been successful, was, to feign that his life was threatened, or had even been attacked by the fury of the nobles, and on this pretext to procure a guard for his person from the people. This band, though composed of citizens, he found it easy to attach to his interests, and with its aid made the first step towards absolute power by seizing the citadeclass="underline" an act which might be considered as a formal assumption of the tyranny, and as declaring a resolution to maintain it by force. But in other respects the more politic tyrants set an example which Augustus might have studied with advantage. Like him, they as carefully avoided the ostentation of power as they guarded its substance. They suffered the ancient forms of the government to remain in apparent vigour, and even in real operation, so far as they did not come into conflict with their own authority. They assumed no title, and were not distinguished from private citizens by any ensigns of superior rank. But they did not the less keep a jealous eye on all whom wealth, or character, or influence might render dangerous rivals; and commonly either forced them into exile or removed them by the stroke of an assassin. They exerted still greater vigilance in suppressing every kind of combination which might cover the germ of a conspiracy. The lowest class of the commonalty they restrained from license, and provided with employment. For this purpose, no less than to gratify their taste or display their magnificence, they frequently adorned their cities with costly buildings, which required years of labour from numerous hands: and, where this expedient did not suffice, they scrupled not to force a part of the population to quit the capital, and seek subsistence in rural occupations. On the same ground they were not reluctant to engage in wars, which afforded them opportunities of relieving themselves, in a less invidious manner, both from troublesome friends and from dangerous foes, as well as of strengthening and extending their dominion by conquest.
Such was the ordinary policy of the best tyrants; and by these arts they were frequently able to reign in peace, and to transmit their power to their children. But the maxims and character of the tyranny generally underwent a change under their successors, and scarcely an instance was known of a tyrannical dynasty that lasted beyond the third generation. But, even where the tyrant did not make himself universally odious, or provoke the vengeance of individuals by his wantonness or cruelty, he was constantly threatened by dangers, both from within and from without, which it required the utmost vigour and prudence to avert. The party which his usurpation had supplanted, though depressed, was still powerful, more exasperated than humbled by its defeat, and ever ready to take advantage of any opportunity of overthrowing him, either by private conspiracy, or by affecting to make common cause with the lower classes, or by calling in foreign aid. And in Greece itself such aid was always at hand: the tyrants indeed were partially leagued together for mutual support. But Sparta threw all her might into the opposite scale. She not only dreaded the contagion of an example which might endanger her own institutions, but was glad to extend her influence by taking an active part in revolutions, which would cause the states restored, by her intervention, to their old government to look up to her with gratitude and dependence as their natural protectress. And accordingly Thucydides ascribes the overthrow of most of the tyrannies which flourished in Greece before the Persian War to the exertions of Sparta.