The Great Events by Famous Historians [Volumes 1-14]

In the autumn of 1268 Hart and his former assistant colleague were sent a third time. As a surveying party had meanwhile been examining the sea-route by way of Quelpaert Island, the mission was enabled to reach the Tsushima Islands this time; but the local authority would not suffer them to land, or at least to stay, nor were the letters accepted, as, in the opinion of the Japanese, "the phraseology was not considered sufficiently modest." Once more the unsuccessful mission returned to Peking, but on this occasion it was with two Japanese "captives"—probably spies; for there is plenty of evidence that even then the art was well understood in Japan. In the summer of 1269 it was resolved to utilize these captives as a peg whereon to hang the conciliatory and virtuous act of returning them. Coreans were intrusted with this mission; but even this letter the Japanese declined to receive, and the envoys were detained a considerable time in the official prisons at Dazai Fu (in Chikuzen).

Early in the year 1270 a Manchu Tartar in Kublai's employ, named Djuyaoka, who had already been employed as a kind of resident or adviser at the court of the King of Corea, was despatched on a solemn mission to Japan, having earnestly volunteered for his new service in spite of his gray hairs. The King of Corea was again ordered to assist, and a Corean in Chinese employ, named Hung Ts'a-k'iu (Marco Polo's Von-Sanichin), was told to demonstrate with a fleet around the Liao-Tung and Corean peninsulas. The envoy is usually called by his adopted Chinese name of Chao Liang-Pih. The mission landed in the spring of 1271 at an island called Golden Ford, which, according to the Chinese characters, ought, I suppose, to be pronounced Kananari in Japanese. Here the strangers met with a very rough reception. The Tartar, however, kept his head well during the various attempts which were made to frighten him; he pointed out the historical precedents to be found in the annals of previous Chinese dynasties, and firmly declined to surrender his credentials except at the chief seat of government, and to the king or ruler in person. It seems that even the Japanese now began to see that the "honest broker," Corea, was playing false to both sides; at all events, they said that "Corea had reported the imminence of a Chinese attack, whereas Kublai's language seemed to deprecate war." Officials from head-quarters explained that "from ancient times till now, no foreign envoy has ever gone east of the Dazai Fu." The reply to this was: "If I cannot see your ruler, you had better take him my head; but you shall not have my documents." The Japanese pleaded that it was too far to the ruler's capital, but that in the mean time they would send officers back with him to China. He was thereupon sent back to await events at Tsushima, and, having remained there a year, he arrived back in Peking in the summer of 1273. In escorting him to Tsushima, the Japanese had sent with him a number of secondary officials to have an audience of Kublai; it appears that the Japanese had been alarmed at the establishment of a Mongol garrison at Kin Chow (I suppose the one near Port Arthur, then within Corean dominions); and the Tartar envoy, during his stay in Tsushima, now sent on these Japanese "envoys" (or spies) in advance, advising Kublai at the same time to humor Japanese susceptibilities by removing the Kin Chow garrison. The cabinet council suggested to Kublai that it would be a good thing to explain to the Japanese envoys that the occupation of Kin Chow was "only temporary," and would be removed so soon as the operations now in process against Quelpaert were at an end. It is related that the "Japanese interpreters"—which probably means Chinese accompanying the Japanese—explained to Kublai that it was quite unnecessary to go round via Corea, and that with a good wind it was possible to reach Japan in a very short time. Kublai said, "Then I must think it over afresh." Late in the year 1273 the same Tartar envoy was once more sent to Japan, but it is not stated by what route or where he first landed; this time he really reached the Dazai Fu, or capital of Chikuzen. In the same year, and possibly in connection with the above mission, a Chinese general, Lu T'ung, with a force of forty thousand men in nine hundred boats, defeated one hundred thousand Japanese—it is not stated where. I am inclined to think, from the consonance of the word Liu and the nine hundred boats, that this must be the affair mentioned lower down. The Manchu Tartar envoy seems to have been a very sensible sort of man, for not only did he bring back with him full details of the names and titles of the Mikado and his ministers, descriptions of the cities and districts, particulars of national customs, local products, etc., but also strongly dissuaded Kublai from engaging in a useless war with Japan; and he also gave some excellent advice to the celebrated Mongol general Bayen, who was just then preparing to "finish off" the southern provinces of China. It may not be generally known, but it is a fact that Bayen himself, in the late autumn of 1273, had been originally destined for the Japanese expedition, and the prisoners captured at the first attack on Siaag-yang Fu (Marco Polo's Sa-yan Fu) had already been handed over to him for service in Japan. The Mongol history also gives a full copy of the letter sent to Japan on this occasion. In it Kublai expresses his surprise at the persistent ignoring by Japan of his successive missions; he charitably suggests that "perhaps the fresh troubles and revolutions in Corea, which have now once more been settled, are more to blame than your own deliberate intentions." The menace of war was a little stronger than in the letter of 1266, but was still decently veiled and somewhat guarded. Before starting, the Manchu had requested that the etiquette to be observed at his audience with the ruler might be laid down. The cabinet council, to be on the safe side, advised: "As the relative ranks prevailing in the country are unknown to us, we have no definite etiquette to specify." On the other hand, both Kublai and his ministers were much too sharp to believe in the power of the "guard-house west of the Dazai Fu," and they came to the sensible conclusion that the Japanese "envoys" were simply war-spies sent by the supreme Japanese government itself.