Nature's Evil [calibre 5.27.0]
- Автор: Эткинд Александр Маркович
- Год: 2022
- Язык: английский
- Год: Wiley
- Переводчик: Sara Jolly
- Жанр: История
Электронная книга - «Nature's Evil [calibre 5.27.0]». Краткое содержание книги:
Mono-resource as an economic platform
In 1802, the Prussian explorer and mining official Alexander von Humboldt found guano on islands off the coast of Peru. Attracted by abundant shoals of fish, huge colonies of seabirds deposited layers of excrement on the rocks. Used by the Incas for centuries, guano was a very productive soil fertiliser. It did not need processing, so the production price consisted of the transportation costs plus mandatory payment to the Peruvian government. Inadvertently, Humboldt’s discovery gave rise to the first case of what would later be called the ‘Dutch disease’. Peruvian currency strengthened. Cheap imports flowed into the country, depriving local peasants and artisans of work. When the supplies of guano ran out, just as silver had previously done, the Peruvian state was left with debts which it could not pay off; in 1876 it filed for bankruptcy. European farmers switched to nitrate fertilisers that were extracted from mines. In another surprising contingency, these mines were also located in Peru. Thanks to these gifts of nature, Peru went to war with its neighbours. Having lost this battle, it ceded its nitrate sites to Chile. Just a little later, the German chemist Fritz Haber found a way of synthesising nitrate fertilisers. They are now made literally from the air, albeit with a huge investment of energy (see chapter 13 ).
Guano is just one example of the tragic fate that a unique, topical mono-resource brings to the nation that happens to own it. It promises wealth and simplicity, and these temptations are irresistible for any political body. Getting a magic tool for distinguishing between good and evil, the state uses a mono-resource, invests in it, protects it, identifies with it, and distributes its profits for the benefit of the subjects. All other sources of prosperity are left to private interests or historical chance. The closer this state is to the exclusive ownership of a mono-resource, the more evident it becomes that this particular kind of raw material is money – the proper currency of this state. Gold, silver, silk, fur, tobacco, opium – all of them were used as money, as the means of payment for labour and goods. Only in labour-dependent countries is capital a converted form of labour; more frequently, capital turns out to be the transfiguration of a chosen resource.
Working on the history of Canada, the sociologist Harold Innis formulated a ‘staples thesis’. He presented this resource-bound development as a succession of changing ‘staples’ – different sorts of raw materiaclass="underline" in the beginning there was fur, then timber, then grain, then oil. Following Innis, the historian Robert Allen based his version of global economic history on a similar idea. 18 Similar concepts of a dominant staple , mono-resource platform or commodity fetishism assert that the economy of political communities – nation-states or, in earlier epochs, empires with their colonies – tends to concentrate on a particular form of raw material to the exclusion of others . In my view, this concentration has been historically typical for most resource-bound states; labour-bound states escape it. The higher the concentration, the more disconcerting the shift. This ‘fetishist’ moment ends either because the raw material runs out or, more frequently, because its consumption falls. When this happens, the economic mechanisms of supply and demand go into a tailspin. With the change of economic platform, the whole pyramid of production and trade, state and society, shakes or even collapses. 19 Such moments are times of trouble – no wonder that the struggling elites try to prevent them by any means.
Why is the raw materials economy concentrated and the labour economy pluralistic and complex? One mechanism is comparative advantage, as described in the economic theory of international trade. States trade because they specialise in different commodities. With time, each economy increases the share of that particular commodity in which it is most efficient. For example, if coal in England was cheaper than in India but in India cotton was cheaper than in England, then the share of coal would grow in the English economy and the share of cotton would grow in the Indian economy. Another mechanism is monopoly. In the commercial exploitation of raw materials, the price of a commodity can differ from the cost of its extraction, changing the calculus of efficiency. 20 The formation of a monopoly is more likely in the case of topical, geographically concentrated resources – sugar rather than salt, diamonds rather than coal. The theory and history of monopoly have been strangely underexplored; we have heard much more about free trade, competition, equilibrium theory and the informational role of prices – all those mechanisms of ‘complete markets’ that historical monopolies have been able to abolish for the sake of their profits. From Jeremy Bentham to John Marshall, social thinkers saw in monopoly a great challenge – a major source of wealth, inequality and evil. But monopolies and cartels continue to define our civilisation. Granted, all these economic mechanisms have always been subjugated to political decisions: when the Indian calicos were banned in England, the whole system of trade was transfigured, as also happened when the OPEC cartel was formed. But, in each case, the terms of trade also grew out of the natural characteristics of a raw material. It wasn’t the Spanish king who ordained Potosí to be the site of silver mines, just as it wasn’t the members of the Politburo who located the site of oil extraction in Western Siberia. This is how nature arranges things; her actions are either random or, what comes to the same thing, inscrutable. But the fates of the Spanish emperor and the Soviet general secretary depended on these acts of nature.
The broader relations between natural resources and labour also belong to the context of comparative advantage. In 1949 two economists who worked for the United Nations, Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer, wrote that the price of a raw material changed more slowly than the price of labour. If one country produces mainly raw material while another invests the productive labour of its citizens, then the first country will gradually become impoverished while the second will become increasingly prosperous. 21 For example, German merchants bought Argentinian hides, took them to Central Europe, made bags or jackets, and sent them back to Argentina. Over the course of decades, you will be able to buy fewer and fewer leather bags and jackets for the same quantity of Argentinian hides (and, while the hides are always the same, the fashion in bags will change dramatically, giving another advantage to their makers). If you exchanged cars for oil, you would get more oil for a Tesla in 2020 than for a Packard in 1920. Prebisch and Singer ascribed this asymmetry to the democratic institutions, which are more successful in labour-dependent countries. Or was it the other way round – was it democratic choice that shunned the reliance on natural resources?