Principles Of Political Economy
- Автор: Mill John Stuart
- Год: 2022
- Язык: английский
- Год: Strelbytskyy Multimedia Publishing
- Жанр: Политика
Электронная книга - «Principles Of Political Economy». Краткое содержание книги:
Beside discussing descriptive issues such as which nations tended to benefit more in a system of trade based on comparative advantage (Mill's answer: those with more elastic demands for other countries' goods), the work also discussed normative issues such as ideal systems of political economy, critiquing proposed systems such as communism and socialism.
Along with A System of Logic, Principles of Political Economy established Mill's reputation as a leading public intellectual. Mill's sympathetic attitude in this work and in other essays toward contemporary socialism, particularly Fourierism, earned him esteem from the working class as one of their intellectual champions.
I desire to confine my remarks to the principle involved in all these suggestions, without taking into account practical difficulties, serious as these must at once be seen to be. I shall suppose that by one or other of these contrivances wages could be kept above the point to which they would be brought by competition. This is as much as to say, above the highest rate which can be afforded by the existing capital consistently with employing all the laborers. For it is a mistake to suppose that competition merely keeps down wages. It is equally the means by which they are kept up. When there are any laborers unemployed, these, unless maintained by charity, become competitors for hire, and wages fall; but when all who were out of work have found employment, wages will not, under the freest system of competition, fall lower. There are strange notions afloat concerning the nature of competition. Some people seem to imagine that its effect is something indefinite; that the competition of sellers may lower prices, and the competition of laborers may lower wages, down to zero, or some unassignable minimum. Nothing can be more unfounded. Goods can only be lowered in price by competition to the point which calls forth buyers sufficient to take them off; and wages can only be lowered by competition until room is made to admit all the laborers to a share in the distribution of the wages-fund. If they fell below this point, a portion of capital would remain unemployed for want of laborers; a counter-competition would commence on the side of capitalists, and wages would rise.
The assumption in the last chapter in regard to competition and custom should be kept in mind in all this reasoning. As a matter of fact, there is not that mobility of labor which insures so free an operation of competition that equality of payment always exists. In reality there is no competition at all between the lower grades of laborers and the higher classes of skilled labor. Of course, the tendency is as explained by Mr. Mill, and as time goes on there is a distinctly greater mobility of labor visible. Vast numbers pass from Scandinavia and other countries of Europe to the United States, or from England to Australia, urged by the desire to go from a community of low to one of higher wages.
Since, therefore, the rate of wages which results from competition distributes the whole wages-fund among the whole laboring population, if law or opinion succeeds in fixing wages above this rate, some laborers are kept out of employment; and as it is not the intention of the philanthropists that these should starve, they must be provided for by a forced increase of the wages-fund—by a compulsory saving. It is nothing to fix a minimum of wages unless there be a provision that work, or wages at least, be found for all who apply for it. This, accordingly, is always part of the scheme, and is consistent with the ideas of more people than would approve of either a legal or a moral minimum of wages. Popular sentiment looks upon it as the duty of the rich, or of the state, to find employment for all the poor. If the moral influence of opinion does not induce the rich to spare from their consumption enough to set all the poor at work at “reasonable wages,” it is supposed to be incumbent on the state to lay on taxes for the purpose, either by local rates or votes of public money. The proportion between labor and the wages-fund would thus be modified to the advantage of the laborers, not by restriction of population, but by an increase of capital.
§ 2. —Would Require as a Condition Legal Measures for Repression of Population.
If this claim on society could be limited to the existing generation; if nothing more were necessary than a compulsory accumulation, sufficient to provide permanent employment at ample wages for the existing numbers of the people; such a proposition would have no more strenuous supporter than myself. Society mainly consists of those who live by bodily labor; and if society, that is, if the laborers, lend their physical force to protect individuals in the enjoyment of superfluities, they are entitled to do so, and have always done so, with the reservation of a power to tax those superfluities for purposes of public utility; among which purposes the subsistence of the people is the foremost. Since no one is responsible for having been born, no pecuniary sacrifice is too great to be made by those who have more than enough, for the purpose of securing enough to all persons already in existence.
But it is another thing altogether when those who have produced and accumulated are called upon to abstain from consuming until they have given food and clothing, not only to all who now exist, but to all whom these or their descendants may think fit to call into existence. Such an obligation acknowledged and acted upon, would suspend all checks, both positive and preventive; there would be nothing to hinder population from starting forward at its rapidest rate; and as the natural increase of capital would, at the best, not be more rapid than before, taxation, to make up the growing deficiency, must advance with the same gigantic strides. But let them work ever so efficiently, the increasing population could not, as we have so often shown, increase the produce proportionally; the surplus, after all were fed, would bear a less and less proportion to the whole produce and to the population: and the increase of people going on in a constant ratio, while the increase of produce went on in a diminishing ratio, the surplus would in time be wholly absorbed; taxation for the support of the poor would engross the whole income of the country; the payers and the receivers would be melted down into one mass.
It would be possible for the state to guarantee employment at ample wages to all who are born. But if it does this, it is bound in self-protection, and for the sake of every purpose for which government exists, to provide that no person shall be born without its consent. To give profusely to the people, whether under the name of charity or of employment, without placing them under such influences that prudential motives shall act powerfully upon them, is to lavish the means of benefiting mankind without attaining the object. But remove the regulation of their wages from their own control; guarantee to them a certain payment, either by law or by the feeding of the community; and no amount of comfort that you can give them will make either them or their descendants look to their own self-restraint as the proper means for preserving them in that state.
The famous poor-laws of Elizabeth, enacted in 1601, were at first intended to relieve the destitute poor, sick, aged, and impotent, but in their administration a share was given to all who begged it. Employers, of course, found it cheaper to hire labor partly paid for by the parish, and the independent farm-laborer who would not go on the parish found his own wages lowered by this kind of competition. This continued a crying evil until it reached the proportions described by May: “As the cost of pauperism, thus encouraged, was increasing, the poorer rate-payers were themselves reduced to poverty. The soil was ill-cultivated by pauper labor, and its rental consumed by parish rates. In a period of fifty years, the poor-rates were quadrupled, and had reached, in 1833, the enormous amount of £8,600,000. In many parishes they were approaching the annual value of the land itself.”[173] The old poor-laws were repealed, and there went into effect in 1834 the workhouse system, which, while not denying subsistence to all those born, required that the giving of aid should be made as disagreeable as possible, in order to stimulate among the poor a feeling of repugnance to all aid from the community. This is also the general idea of poor-relief in the United States.
173
“Constitutional History of England,” vol. ii, p. 563. See also Nicholls's “History of the Poor Laws,” vol. ii, p. 303.