The Story of Russia

Muravieff was back at his post in 1859. Both he and Poutiatine tried to induce the Japanese to give up Karafuto (Saghalien), but without success. At this time there was again trouble between China and the allied British and French, and when in 1860, a British-French force marched on Peking, Russia had sent another empire builder, General Ignatieff, to watch if he could not secure something. He did; when the allies entered Peking, Ignatieff sought Prince Kung and told him that the "foreign devils" would surely seize the country unless some strong power compelled them to leave. Russia was willing to do this, because she had always been fond of China; and all she asked was a strip of outlying territory of no value to China. Prince Kung gladly signed away the whole east coast of Manchuria, six hundred miles long; and Ignatieff redeemed his promise by visiting Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, the British and French plenipotentiaries. After paying them some flattering compliments, he made the remark that the Peiho river would freeze in a few days, and if they did not get out at once, they would have to stay all winter in Peking. The two gentlemen finished their business in a hurry, packed up, and left, but not without thanking Ignatieff for his kindness and reporting the matter to their government, which did not hear of the Russian's diplomacy until a year later. This is how Russia extended her empire on the Pacific Coast.

For many years the efforts to secure the whole island of Karafuto continued and Japan saw that war must follow unless a sacrifice was made. In 1875, Japan surrendered the island, in return for the Kurile group, but the Japanese treasured in their hearts the loss and disgrace. It was this which caused the assault upon the present czar, when he was traveling in Japan.

In 1894 the war between Japan and China broke out, and when China, humbled, sued for peace, Japan demanded the cession of the Liao-tung Peninsula,—where Port Arthur is located,—besides making other conditions. When this became known, Russia, after securing the help of Germany and France, gave Japan the "friendly advice," which was really a threat, not to take that peninsula. Japan, single-handed, could not fight the three powers, and gave way but every Japanese, high or low, young or old, was determined to pay off Russia. They bought or built war vessels everywhere and increased their army. Russia did not like this, and proposed that Japan should take all the islands in the Pacific, the Philippines, Hawaii, Borneo, etc., and leave the continent of Asia to Russia. Japan declined, and went on building ships. In the end of 1898, Russia announced that she had "leased" the very Liao-tung Peninsula which she had prevented Japan from taking. Japan understood, as the whole world did, that this "lease" meant possession. The Japanese statesmen did not protest, because there was but one protest that Russia would heed,—an appeal to arms. That was Japan's method when, in 1899, Alexander Pavloff, the Russian minister in Korea, secured from that government a concession in the port of Masampo, opening into the entrance to the Japan Sea. Japan's demand was: Let Masampo go, or it means war, and Russia evacuated Masampo, while Pavloff was told that he might take a furlough. Then came 1900, the Boxer troubles and the international march upon Peking. Japanese officers took note of the Russian troops, leaving the Russians to do the same with their soldiers. Japan never ceased her preparations. In the latter part of 1901, Marquis Ito Hirobumi visited the United States and crossed over to England, where he proposed an offensive-defensive alliance. British statesmen hesitated, when Ito told them in plain terms that if no such treaty was concluded, he was authorized to go on to Russia, and make the best terms he could for his country.