An Ugly Truth: Inside Facebook's Battle for Domination [calibre 4.99.5]
- Автор: Frenkel Sheera, Kang Cecilia
- Год: 2021
- Язык: английский
- Год: HARPERCOLLINS
- ISBN: 9780062960672
- Жанр: Прочая деловая литература
Электронная книга - «An Ugly Truth: Inside Facebook's Battle for Domination [calibre 4.99.5]». Краткое содержание книги:
**Award-winning *New York Times* reporters Sheera Frenkel and Cecilia Kang unveil the tech story of our times in a riveting, behind-the-scenes exposé that offers the definitive account of Facebook’s fall from grace**.
Once one of Silicon Valley’s greatest success stories, Facebook has been under constant fire for the past five years, roiled by controversies and crises. It turns out that while the tech giant was connecting the world, they were also mishandling users’ data, spreading fake news, and amplifying dangerous, polarizing hate speech.
The company, many said, had simply lost its way. But the truth is far more complex. Leadership decisions enabled, and then attempted to deflect attention from, the crises. Time after time, Facebook’s engineers were instructed to create tools that encouraged people to spend as much time on the platform as possible, even as those same tools boosted inflammatory rhetoric, conspiracy theories, and partisan filter bubbles. And while consumers and lawmakers focused their outrage on privacy breaches and misinformation, Facebook solidified its role as the world’s most voracious data-mining machine, posting record profits, and shoring up its dominance via aggressive lobbying efforts.
Drawing on their unrivaled sources, Sheera Frenkel and Cecilia Kang take readers inside the complex court politics, alliances and rivalries within the company to shine a light on the fatal cracks in the architecture of the tech behemoth. Their explosive, exclusive reporting led them to a shocking conclusion: The missteps of the last five years were not an anomaly but an inevitability—this is how Facebook was built to perform. In a period of great upheaval, growth has remained the one constant under the leadership of Mark Zuckerberg and Sheryl Sandberg. Both have been held up as archetypes of uniquely 21st century executives—he the tech “boy genius” turned billionaire, she the ultimate woman in business, an inspiration to millions through her books and speeches. But sealed off in tight circles of advisers and hobbled by their own ambition and hubris, each has stood by as their technology is coopted by hate-mongers, criminals and corrupt political regimes across the globe, with devastating consequences. In *An Ugly Truth* , they are at last held accountable.
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He had been influenced by a book called What You Do Is Who You Are, by Ben Horowitz, one half of Andreessen Horowitz, the VC firm that invested early in Facebook. (Marc Andreessen, Zuckerberg’s friend and a Facebook board member, was the other half.) In his book, Horowitz argues that at various stages of development, tech companies demand two kinds of CEOs: wartime and peacetime leaders. In periods of peace, he writes, a company can focus on expanding and reinforcing its strengths. In times of war, the threats are existential, and the company has to hunker down to fight for survival. Google’s CEO Eric Schmidt had led the search engine’s growth into a global powerhouse during a period of peace and little competition. But Larry Page had taken over as CEO as the company saw new threats in social media and mobile technology. “Peacetime CEO works to minimize conflict. Wartime CEO heightens the contradictions,” Horowitz writes. “Peacetime CEO strives for broad-based buy-in. Wartime CEO neither indulges consensus-building nor tolerates disagreements.”2
The idea was widely embraced by tech leaders, but it wasn’t new. In public speeches and interviews,3 Horowitz acknowledged that he had been inspired by Only the Paranoid Survive, written by Intel’s famously brutal former CEO Andy Grove, who had steered the company from the production of memory chips to processors. Grove was notorious in Silicon Valley for bullying challengers and opponents as part of his philosophy: never relax, because a new rival is coming just around the corner.
(In a blog post, Horowitz conceded that he had also taken some inspiration from the movie The Godfather, quoting a scene where consigliere Tom Hagen asks the Corleone family don, “Mike, why am I out?” and Michael Corleone replies, “You’re not a wartime consigliere.” The reference to The Godfather’s Mob boss struck some Facebook employees as apt. “It shouldn’t surprise anyone that Mark would want to think of himself as modeling his behavior after Andy when in fact he was taking cues from Hollywood’s most notorious gangster,” said one M-Team member. “You won’t find anyone more ruthless in business than Mark.”)
From that day forward, Zuckerberg continued, he was taking on the role of wartime CEO. He would assume more direct control over all aspects of the business. He could no longer sequester himself to focus only on new products. More decisions would fall to him.
The M-Team was silent. Sandberg and a small group of executives who knew in advance what Zuckerberg had prepared to say that day nodded approvingly. But others could only keep their faces carefully neutral as they tried to assess what Zuckerberg’s words meant for their departments and personal advancement. Technically, as the founder and stakeholder with a majority of voting shares since Facebook’s earliest days, Zuckerberg had always been in control of the company. But he had liberally delegated many parts of the business. Executives in charge of arms like WhatsApp and Instagram could operate with a fair amount of independence, and powerful heads of engineering within Facebook’s central product had cultivated their own, loyal teams. “Zuckerberg hired and promoted managers who had big dreams for themselves. For years, he had kept them happy because they knew they had their relative autonomy,” noted one member of the M-Team who attended the meeting. “Now he seemed to be saying that was about to change.”
Zuckerberg’s affinity for the first Roman emperor, Caesar Augustus, whom he had studied at both Exeter and Harvard, was well known. Up to this point, Zuckerberg’s governance had been analogous to that of the Roman Republic. There was a clear leader, but his power was backed by a Senate of sorts that deliberated over big decisions and policies. What he was outlining now looked more like Rome’s move from a republic to an empire. Zuckerberg was establishing rule by one.
Predictably, Boz was one of the first to weigh in with an endorsement of the declaration. It was the best path forward for the company to put Zuckerberg at the center of all decision making, he said.
Zuckerberg’s proclamation came on the heels of a major reorganization at the company. Two months earlier, he had overhauled the leadership ranks by reshuffling the duties of his deputies. Chris Cox, head of product, would oversee all of the company’s apps, including Blue, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Instagram. The chief technology officer, Mike Schroepfer, was put in charge of all emerging products, such as virtual reality and blockchain. Javier Olivan, the head of the growth team, added security, ads, and services to his portfolio.4 Sandberg remained chief operating officer, but it was less clear if she was still, in effect, Zuckerberg’s second-in-command. She hadn’t been mentioned in the announcement. Now, with Zuckerberg asserting himself even further, it seemed he envisioned himself as number one—and then there was everybody else.
Discontented employees had been departing all year. Jan Koum, the cofounder of WhatsApp, announced his departure in April;5 he later explained that Zuckerberg had broken his promise to keep WhatsApp separate from the Facebook app and to protect privacy.6 Kevin Systrom, the cofounder of Instagram, left in September for similar reasons: Zuckerberg had reneged on promises.7 And of course, Stamos had officially given up his duties in August but, in fact, had given his resignation months earlier.
At age thirty-four, roughly fourteen years after founding Facebook, Zuckerberg was doubling down on the insignia he had typed into the bottom of the Facebook website in 2004: “A Mark Zuckerberg Production.”
“From day one, it was his company,” an executive at the meeting said. But “he was happy to let other people do the stuff he wasn’t interested in. That all changed.”
Zuckerberg may have changed his mind about delegating responsibility, but he had always exhibited a ruthless streak, especially when it came to competition. Even with the acquisition of Instagram in 2012, he had continued to fret over a new crop of apps that could draw users away from Facebook and put his company behind in the race for mobile supremacy. Then Javier Olivan, vice president of growth, told him about Onavo, an Israeli mobile analytics start-up. The company operated a series of consumer-facing apps, including a virtual private network for mobile phone users, but of greater interest to Olivan was Onavo’s technology, which enabled mobile publishers to chart how well not only their own apps were performing but also those of their competitors. Onavo’s analytics tracked activity such as the number of times a user visited other mobile apps, how long they used them, and what kinds of functionality were most popular in those apps. It was “really cool for identifying acquisition targets,” Olivan wrote in an email.8 Zuckerberg was intrigued, and beginning in early summer, Olivan began to visit Tel Aviv to meet with the founders of the company to learn more about the capabilities of the service and how much competitive insight Onavo truly offered. After receiving Olivan’s reports, Zuckerberg decided the data was not only valuable to Facebook but also potentially helpful to rivals.
On October 13, 2013, Onavo announced that it had been acquired by Facebook—along with the company’s proprietary technology and data, which created in-depth reports on how people all over the world were using the internet. Facebook would be absorbing Onavo’s thirty-odd employees in Israel and its founders, Guy Rosen and Roi Tiger.