The Case of the Dubious Bridegroom

“He’ll be blasted all right,” Jarvis said, “whenever we get ready to press the button.”

Covington stroked his gray mustache. His eyes twinkled with appreciation of the picture his assistant created.

Judge Minden said, “As the names of prospective jurors are called, you will come forward and take your place in the jury box. Mr. Clerk, draw twelve names.”

Judge Minden made a brief statement to the jury impanelment concerning their duties, called on the district attorney to advise the jurors of the nature of the case, asked the prospective jurors a few routine questions, then turned them over to the attorneys for questioning.

Mason varied his usual courtroom technique by asking only the most vague and general questions.

District Attorney Covington, suddenly suspicious, whispered a warning to Jarvis, forced Jarvis to continue with a long line of searching questions until gradually it dawned on Covington that the district attorney’s office was apparently being maneuvered into the position of trying to get a hand-picked jury, while the defense seemed casually willing to accept any twelve men who were fair.

Questions concerning the death penalty removed four jurors from the box, but their places were filled, and Mason, smiling, seemed to treat the entire matter as being a mere procedural formality preliminary to an acquittal.

Nettled, District Attorney Covington took over some of the examination himself, and finally, late that afternoon when a jury had been impaneled, the thoroughly exasperated district attorney realized that Mason had outgeneraled him, because the lawyer, swiftly exercising those peremptory challenges for which no reason need be given, showed that he had somehow acquired a thorough knowledge of the characters and backgrounds of the prospective jurymen.

“Do you care to make an opening statement, Mr. District Attorney?” Judge Minden asked.

It had been understood that Jarvis was to make the opening statement, but Covington, angry and flustered, was on his feet in front of the jury, telling them that he expected to prove that the defendant, Edward Charles Garvin, had, as the result of an illegal divorce, found himself faced with a bigamy prosecution, involved in a hopeless maze of domestic entanglements, and so had conceived the idea of extricating himself by the simple but deadly expedient of pulling the trigger of a revolver.

“I expect to show you, ladies and gentlemen,” Covington said, his voice crisp with denunciation, “that this man deliberately lured his wife into a midnight appointment, an appointment from which he had carefully planned she should never return alive. A cold-blooded, deliberate, well-planned, skillfully executed murder which might never have been uncovered had it not been...”

A tug at his coattail from Samuel Jarvis made Covington realize suddenly he was telling too much. He paused, cleared his throat, said, “had it not been for the efforts of the police of this county, working in friendly co-operation with those of Los Angeles County.

“I shall not, however, ladies and gentlemen, dwell at any great length upon the evidence. I propose to show that the defendant fled from the United States to Mexico, where he sought haven and sanctuary from a charge which his wife had placed against him, and...”

“Just a moment,” Mason interrupted cheerfully, “Your Honor, I object to any attempt on the part of the prosecution to introduce evidence of any other independent crime for the purpose of discrediting the defendant, and charge the remarks of the district attorney as prejudicial misconduct. I ask that the Court admonish the jury to disregard the remarks.”

“If the Court please,” Covington said angrily, “this is an exception to the general rule. This is a case where the charge of bigamy which was placed against the defendant by his wife is the motive for the murder. That is something counsel for the defense knows very well. It is a case where we are permitted to introduce evidence of another crime. We are forced to do so in order to prove our motive. It was because of this crime that the defendant fled to Mexico and because of it that he decided to murder his wife, and make himself a widower, so that he could then go through another marriage ceremony with the woman with whom he had become infatuated.”

“Same objection,” Mason said, cheerfully, “same assignment as misconduct.”

Judge Minden said, testily, “Well, of course, Mr. District Attorney, I don’t know what the evidence is going to disclose, but it would seem to me that you’re anticipating a legal point. Wouldn’t it be better to reserve this matter until the time comes when you wish to put in your evidence, and then we can have an objection from the defense, the jury can be excluded during argument, and the Court can then make an intelligent ruling? This is, in a way, approaching the subject by the back door, and the Court is hardly in a position to make an intelligent ruling. It may be part of the res gestae but in order to determine that point we should first find out what the circumstances are.

“I think it would be much better if you simply stated to the jury what you expected to prove in regard to the motions and activities of the defendant at the time the murder was committed and then left these legal questions to be disposed of in an orderly manner.”