The Historians' History of the World 06 [The Early Roman Empire]

Early German Weapons

In any case the scheme was successful, for Varus abandoned himself to reckless unconcern, deceived less by the peaceful submission of the people and by intercourse with the nobles, whom he frequently welcomed at his table, than by the fact that suitors positively crowded to demand justice of him. There is probably some connection between the endeavours of the princes to convince him that the Germans acquiesced voluntarily in the Roman order and the fact that they asked him for troops to maintain general tranquillity. Thus it came about that he rudely rebuffed those who, suspecting treachery behind the German show of amity, advised him to be on his guard, and that in spite of frequent warnings on the part of Segestes, moreover, he detached small divisions of his troops to convoy the transport. Presently the news came that a remote tribe or province had risen against the Romans. This had been done at the instigation of the conspirators, in order that Varus might proceed from his camp in a particular direction.

It would be of the highest importance if we could gather from our authorities an approximate idea of who the rebels were or where they dwelt; as it is, we are left to conjecture. We have seen which tribes besides the Cherusci were subdued by Tiberius: the Caninefates, Hattuarii, Bructeri, and Chauci. The first two need not be considered, as they lived too near to the Rhine and were thus too completely within the sphere of Roman dominion. There then remain only the Bructeri and Chauci; and as the latter tribe was subsequently in possession of an eagle belonging to one of the legions of Varus, and therefore must have taken part in the battle, the ἄπωθεν οἰκοῦντες of Dion would seem more appropriate to them than to the Bructeri.

But it does not greatly matter in favour of which we decide. One of the two tribes that dwelt to the southwest of the Cherusci (the Marsi and Chatti) may certainly be left out of account; for the last-named, as has already been explained, were in no way dependent upon Rome. Of the Marsi we may conclude that they took part in the struggle, as they too captured an eagle, but we do not hear that they had been subject to Rome, and if they had retired into the interior of Germany to preserve their liberties they would not have been attacked by Tiberius in the years 4 and 5; for his attention at that time was evidently fixed upon the northwest. And it is plain that Varus made no attempt at a wider extension of Roman dominion. It is just possible that it may have been a Cheruscan tribe in the northwest or southwest; but it is on the whole more likely that the revolt was started by a people who occupied a dependent position towards Rome. It would therefore be in the interest of Arminius to display the loyalty of his own tribe. But, whatever the race that revolted, the day of departure from camp was fixed.

Arminius

To avoid rousing the suspicions of Varus the princes proposed to assist him and promised to join him with their forces along his line of march, which was exactly determined by the situation of the rebellious province and agreed upon between him and the Cheruscan princes. The conspirators had thus a pretext for issuing their own summons to arms without giving umbrage to the Romans dispersed throughout the country at military stations, and it is even possible that they induced Varus to send forth the command to all quarters. They themselves stayed with him, not only to sustain him in his unconcern, but also to watch him and to be at hand if the plot should happen to be betrayed to him by the Roman party. For this was no imaginary danger.

The evening before the start, while Varus was entertaining the princes of the Cherusci at his table, Segestes came forward and openly charged Arminius and his adherents with conspiracy, demanding the arrest of Arminius and the ringleaders of the plot, and offering to be put in fetters himself as a proof of the truth of his accusation. Varus turned a deaf ear to these disclosures, probably because the notorious enmity between Segestes and Arminius made him doubt the good faith of the accuser, and the start took place next morning.

The conspirators now took leave of Varus on the pretext of putting themselves at the head of their forces and bringing them to join him; but in reality these forces were already stationed in readiness along the route which Varus would have to take. In addition to this, word must have been sent even to the Marsi and Chauci to hasten with their levies to a particular point. Orders were then given for a general massacre of the isolated Roman garrisons.

It has frequently been observed that the revolt cannot have been represented to Varus as very serious; otherwise the carelessness of his dispositions on the march is absolutely incomprehensible. The crowd of women and children who were in the camp and accompanied the army proves either that he intended to pitch his summer camp for a longer or shorter period in the rebellious province after he had subdued it, or that if he meant to send them back to the Rhine their return would not involve a very circuitous journey.

Meanwhile the long array, marching in imperfect order and hampered by enormous quantities of baggage, had got entangled in difficult paths that led uphill and downhill through the thick forest, and while they were engaged in toilsomely improving the road by felling trees, making bridges, etc., very wet weather set in with a storm so violent that branches were torn from the huge trees and hurled down upon the marching men beneath. The ground became slippery, and the difficulty of getting along amidst the roots and trunks of trees was doubled; and in this precarious plight the army found itself suddenly assailed on all sides by Germans. At this juncture, when he realised the treachery of the Germans, Varus can hardly have come to any other resolution than to escape from a tract of country so dangerous by taking the shortest road to the Rhine, where he would be able to deploy his forces and checkmate the enemy.

It has been asserted that he could most easily have accomplished this by returning to his summer camp, from which a properly constructed military road must certainly have led to his winter quarters on the Rhine. But who can tell whether Varus did not reflect that to go back by the way he had come would involve too great hardship and loss, while a diversion of his line of march to the river might be effected with no greater danger and might even offer his army a more easily attainable condition of safety? Nor need we lose sight of the possibility that he arrived at a wrong decision.