The Great Events by Famous Historians [Volumes 1-14]

Hampered by the difficulty of keeping the merchantmen together, and baffled by contrary winds and violent weather, Howe's passage was unusually slow and tedious.

The Spanish Government having gained intelligence of the approach of this powerful force, instantly took measures to attack the expedition before it could arrive at its destination. For this purpose the combined fleets of Spain and France which lay in the harbor of Algeciras were reënforced, and dispositions were made for intercepting the British ships on their passage through the Straits.

These arrangements had scarcely been completed when, on the evening of October 10th, a fresh westerly wind sprang up in the bay, and toward night gradually increased in violence till it blew a hurricane. Soon the enemy's vessels were in distress, many were dragging their anchors, and signal-guns were fired for help in rapid succession. Throughout the night the fury of the storm did not abate, and daybreak disclosed the havoc among the squadrons at Algeciras; a ship of the line and a frigate were ashore at Orange Grove, a French liner had suffered great damage to her masts and rigging, and the St. Michael, of seventy-two guns, was discovered close in shore off the Orange Bastion in distress. She was immediately fired at and after having lost four men she was run ashore on the line-wall, and taken possession of by Captain Curtis. Her commander, Admiral Don Juan Moreno, and her crew of six hundred fifty men were landed as prisoners. These misfortunes materially affected the ulterior movements of the combined fleets. In the mean time Lord Howe had on the 8th of the month arrived off Cape St. Vincent, and a frigate was sent on from there to gain information from the consul at Faro of the enemy's dispositions. Two days afterward she returned with the intelligence that the combined fleets, consisting of nearly fifty sail, lay at anchor at Algeciras.

Upon the receipt of this news a council of war was held, and clear and stringent orders were afterward issued for the guidance of the masters in charge of the merchantmen, that the convoy might be conducted safely into the harbor of Gibraltar. On the 11th, the fleet passed through the Straits in three divisions, the third and centre squadrons in line of battle ahead, the second squadron in reserve; the Victory led ahead of the third squadron.

By sunset the van had arrived off Europa Point, and before nightfall four of the transports had anchored under the guns of the fortress. By an unpardonable inattention to the orders they had received, the masters of the other vessels failed to make the bay and were driven away to the eastward of the Rock. To the astonishment of Howe, who had looked upon an engagement as inevitable, the Spaniards did not attempt to intercept the convoy.

During the two following days the British Admiral was engaged in collecting the transports to the eastward, and preparing for action in case the Spaniards should attack.

On the 13th the combined fleets, consisting of forty-four ships of the line, five frigates, and twenty-nine xebec-cutters and brigs, got under way and stood to the southward, with the apparent intention of bearing down upon Lord Howe's force. But though the Spanish Admiral had the weather-gauge, and notwithstanding his fleet was greatly superior in numbers to the English, he contented himself with the execution of some harmless manœuvres, and permitted the whole of the transports to be conducted safely into Gibraltar under the very muzzles of his guns. The stores and provisions were immediately landed, and two regiments of infantry—Twenty-fifth and Twenty-ninth—were disembarked under the superintendence of Lord Mulgrave.

Having accomplished his mission and relieved the fortress, Lord Howe prepared to return to England.

On October 19th, taking advantage of an easterly wind, he formed his fleet in order of battle and sailed through the Straits. At this time the combined fleets were cruising a few miles north-east of Ceuta, and in view of Howe's squadron, of which they had the weather-gauge.

The two fleets remained near each other during the night, and on the following morning, the wind having come round to the northward, the Spaniards still held the advantage and could have closed for action at any moment. It was Lord Howe's desire, if possible, to avoid an engagement in the narrow and dangerous waters of the Straits, and to entice the enemy to accept battle in the open sea; with this object he continued on his course to the westward.

At sunset on the 20th the combined fleets, greatly superior to the English in force and numbers, came up with the rear division, under Admiral Barrington, and a partial action commenced, but the enemy remained at such a respectful distance, keeping as near as they could haul to the wind, that the firing was comparatively harmless on both sides. The two admirals De Guichen and Cordova led the enemy's van, and it was apparently their intention to cut off and destroy the rear division of the British fleet; but though they had the superiority in force and the advantage of the wind, they could not be induced to close, and soon after midnight the firing ceased. The next morning the two fleets were still in sight, but as the Spaniards evinced no disposition to renew the engagement, Howe, whose orders did not permit him to provoke the enemy, continued on his homeward voyage.