The Historians' History of the World 02 [Israel, India, Persia, Phoenicia, Minor Nations of Western Asia]

WAR IN SICILY BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE

[283-264 B.C.]

For more than a century the feud between the powers of Carthage and Syracuse had ravaged the beautiful Sicilian island. The war was carried on on both sides partly by political propaganda, Carthage maintaining relations with the aristocratic-republican opposition party in Syracuse, and the Syracusan dynasties with the national parties in the Greek cities that paid tribute to Carthage, and partly by means of mercenary armies with the aid of which Timoleon and Agathocles, as well as the Phœnician generals, had fought their battles. As both sides used the same methods, the contest was carried on with a disregard for truth and honour unknown in the history of occidental peoples. The Syracusans were finally defeated. In 314, before the breaking out of the war, Carthage claimed only a third of the island, that lying west of Heracleia Minoa and Himera, and had recognised the hegemony of the Syracusans over several of the eastern states. The expulsion of Pyrrhus from Sicily and Italy (276) left the greater part of the island, especially Acragas, in the possession of Carthage, only Tauromenium and the southeastern end remaining to Syracuse. About 283 a Campanian troop that had served under Agathocles, and had continued marauding on their own account since his death, had established themselves in Messana, the second largest city on the eastern coast, and seat of the anti-Syracusan party. They massacred or drove out the citizens, divided the women, children, and houses among themselves, and settling down to complete possession of the city soon became the third power in the island. The Carthaginians witnessed these proceedings by which the Syracusans received a powerful adversary as neighbour instead of a kindred or friendly people, without displeasure; with the support of Carthage the new-comers, or Mamertines (Sons of Mars), arranged themselves against Pyrrhus, and the untimely withdrawal of this king restored to the Carthaginians all their powder.

A young Syracusan officer Hiero, son of Hierocles, who had drawn attention to himself by reason of his close kinship to Pyrrhus and the bravery with which he had fought in the battles of that king, was appointed head of the Syracusan army (274). By his moderation and wise generalship he won the confidence of all his supporters, dismissing the mercenaries, reorganising the citizen-militia, and trying first as general, later as king, at the head of civic troops to restore the vanished power of Hellas. With the Carthaginians, who in conjunction with the Greeks had driven Pyrrhus from the island, the Syracusans were at that time at peace; their nearest enemy being the Mamertines, kinsmen of the hated mercenaries. In alliance with the Romans, who about this time sent their legions against the Campanians in Rhegium, Hiero turned towards Messana. By a great victory, after which Hiero was made king of the Siceliotes (269), he succeeded in confining the Mamertines within the limits of their own city, and after the siege had lasted several years they were reduced to extremity—finding themselves unable longer to defend the city unaided against Hiero. A conditional surrender was impossible, the axe of the executioner that had been used upon the Rhegium Campanians was surely awaiting those of Messana in Syracuse, and their only hope of safety lay in delivering over the city either to the Carthaginians or the Romans, to both of whom the conquest of the important position must be of equal moment.

Whether it would be more advantageous to surrender to the Phœnicians or to the lords of Italy was doubtful; after long hesitation the majority of the Campanian citizens finally decided to give over possession of their fortress to the Romans. Rome was striving for the possession of Italy as Carthage was for that of Sicily; but the plans of neither power could proceed further at that time. Just here lay a reason for the wish of each that a neutral power should permanently establish itself on its frontier—Rome looking to Tarentum, Carthage to Syracuse and Messana. Failing this, each preferred to occupy the cities itself rather than let them fall into the hands of its rival.

[264 B.C.]

As Carthage had tried in Italy,—Rome being on the point of taking Rhegium and Tarentum,—to acquire these cities for herself, her purpose being frustrated by a mere accident, so Rome now saw in Sicily an opportunity of bringing Messana into her symmachy; should this design fail, the city could not hope to remain independent or turn Syracusan, she would be thrown into the arms of Phœnicia. Would it be justifiable to let an opportunity, that would certainly never return, escape, of taking possession of the natural bridge-head between Sicily and Italy and by securing it to themselves by a firm and, for very good reasons, reliable occupation; was it also justifiable to sacrifice, in renouncing all hopes of Messana, dominion over the last free passage between the eastern and western seas and Italy’s free trade? Other objections than those of sentiment and justice arose to the occupation of Messana. That it must lead to a war with Carthage was the least among them, Rome having nothing to fear from such a war, however serious it might be. It was far more important that she should, by the crossing of the sea, depart from the purely Italian and continental policy she had formerly pursued; so the system founded by the authors of Rome’s greatness was relinquished for another, the consequences of which no one could foresee. It was one of those moments when reflection and calculation cease, and faith in a personal star and that of the fatherland alone gives courage to grasp the hand that beckons out of the future, and follow wherever it may lead. Long and earnestly the Senate deliberated upon the offer of the councillors to send the legions to the assistance of the Mamertines, yet came to no decision. But among the citizens to whom the matter was finally referred, there was alive that consciousness of strength of a power that has come to greatness through its own efforts. The conquest of Italy gave to the Romans, as that of Macedonia had given to the Greeks, courage to blaze a new political path for themselves; support of the Mamertines was warranted by the power of protection claimed by Rome over various Italian states. The Italians from over seas were taken into the Italian confederation, and on the proposition of the citizens’ council it was decided to send them aid (264).