The World's Greatest Books [Volumes 1-15, 17-20]
- Автор: Gutenberg
- Год: 1910
- Язык: английский
- Жанр: Культурология
Электронная книга - «The World's Greatest Books [Volumes 1-15, 17-20]». Краткое содержание книги:
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 01 — Fiction от Неизвестный
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 02 — Fiction от Неизвестный
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 03 — Fiction от Неизвестный
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 04 — Fiction от Неизвестный
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 05 — Fiction от Неизвестный
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 06 — Fiction от Неизвестный
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 07 — Fiction от Неизвестный
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 08 — Fiction от Неизвестный
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 09 — Lives and Letters от Неизвестный
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 10 — Lives and Letters от Неизвестный
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 11 — Ancient and Mediæval History от Неизвестный
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 12 — Modern History от Неизвестный
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 13 — Religion and Philosophy от Неизвестный
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 14 — Philosophy and Economics от Неизвестный
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 15 — Science от Неизвестный
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 17 — Poetry and Drama от Неизвестный
The world's greatest books от Mee, Arthur, 1875-1943, joint editor & Hammerton, John Alexander, Sir, 1871-1949, joint editor & McClure, S. S. (Samuel Sidney), 1857-1949, joint editor
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 19 — Travel and Adventure от Неизвестный
The World's Greatest Books — Volume 20 — Miscellaneous Literature and Index от Неизвестный
ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT
Cosmos, a Sketch of the Universe
Frederick Henry Alexander von Humboldt was born in Berlin on September 14, 1769. In 1788 he made the acquaintance of George Forster, one of Captain Cook's companions, and geological excursions made with him were the occasion of his first publications, a book on the nature of basalt. His work in the administration of mines in the principalities of Bayreuth and Anspach furnished materials for a treatise on fossil flora; and in 1827, when he was residing in Paris, he gave to the world his "Voyage to the Equinoctial Regions of the New Continent," which embodies the results of his investigations in South America. Two years later he organised an expedition to Asiatic Russia, charging himself with all the scientific observations. But his principal interest lay in the accomplishment of that physical description of the universe for which all his previous studies had been a preparation, and which during the years 1845 to 1848 appeared under the comprehensive title of "Cosmos, or Sketch of a Physical Description of the Universe." Humboldt died on May 6, 1859.
I.—The Physical Study of the World
The natural world may be opposed to the intellectual, or nature to art taking the latter term in its higher sense as embracing the manifestations of the intellectual power of man; but these distinctions—which are indicated in most cultivated languages—must not be suffered to lead to such a separation of the domain of physics from that of the intellect as would reduce the physics of the universe to a mere assemblage of empirical specialities. Science only begins for man from the moment when his mind lays hold of matter—when he tries to subject the mass accumulated by experience to rational combinations.
Science is mind applied to nature. The external world only exists for us so far as we conceive it within ourselves, and as it shapes itself within us into the form of a contemplation of nature. As intelligence and language, thought and the signs of thought, are united by secret and indissoluble links, so, and almost without our being conscious of it, the external world and our ideas and feelings melt into each other. "External phenomena are translated," as Hegel expresses it in his "Philosophy of History," "in our internal representation of them." The objective world, thought by us, reflected in us, is subjected to the unchanging, necessary, and all-conditioning forms of our intellectual being.
The activity of the mind exerts itself on the elements furnished to it by the perceptions of the senses. Thus, in the youth of nations there manifests itself in the simplest intuition of natural facts, in the first efforts made to comprehend them, the germ of the philosophy of nature.
If the study of physical phenomena be regarded in its bearings not on the material wants of man, but on his general intellectual progress, its highest result is found in the knowledge of those mutual relations which link together the general forces of nature. It is the intuitive and intimate persuasion of the existence of these relations which at once enlarges and elevates our views and enhances our enjoyment. Such extended views are the growth of observation, of meditation, and of the spirit of the age, which is ever reflected in the operations of the human mind whatever may be their direction.
From the time when man, in interrogating nature, began to experiment or to produce phenomena under definite conditions, and to collect and record the fruits of his experience—so that investigation might no longer be restricted by the short limits of a single life—the philosophy of nature laid aside the vague and poetic forms with which she had at first been clothed, and has adopted a more severe character.
The history of science teaches us how inexact and incomplete observations have led, through false inductions, to that great number of erroneous physical views which have been perpetuated as popular prejudices among all classes of society. Thus, side by side with a solid and scientific knowledge of phenomena, there has been preserved a system of pretended results of observation, the more difficult to shake because it takes no account of any of the facts by which it is overturned.
This empiricism—melancholy inheritance of earlier times—invariably maintains whatever axioms it has laid down; it is arrogant, as is everything that is narrow-minded; while true physical philosophy, founded on science, doubts because it seeks to investigate thoroughly—distinguishes between that which is certain and that which is simply probable—and labours incessantly to bring its theories nearer to perfection by extending the circle of observation. This assemblage of incomplete dogmas bequeathed from one century to another, this system of physics made up of popular prejudices, is not only injurious because it perpetuates error with all the obstinacy of ill-observed facts, but also because it hinders the understanding from rising to the level of great views of nature.
Instead of seeking to discover the mean state around which, in the midst of apparent independence and irregularity, the phenomena really and invariably oscillate, this false science delights in multiplying apparent exceptions to the dominion of fixed laws, and seeks, in organic forms and the phenomena of nature, other marvels than those presented by internal progressive development, and by regular order and succession. Ever disinclined to recognise in the present the analogy of the past, it is always disposed to believe the order of nature suspended by perturbations, of which it places the seat, as if by chance, sometimes in the interior of the earth, sometimes in the remote regions of space.
II.—The Inductive Method
The generalisation of laws which were first applied to smaller groups of phenomena advances by successive gradations, and their empire is extended, and their evidence strengthened, so long as the reasoning process is directed to really analogous phenomena. Empirical investigation begins by single perceptions, which are afterwards classed according to their analogy or dissimilarity. Observation is succeeded at a much later epoch by experiment, in which phenomena are made to arise under conditions previously determined on by the experimentalist, guided by preliminary hypotheses, or a more or less just intuition of the connection of natural objects and forces.
The results obtained by observation and experiment lead by the path of induction and analogy to the discovery of empirical laws, and these successive phases in the application of human intellect have marked different epochs in the life of nations. It has been by adhering closely to this inductive path that the great mass of facts has been accumulated which now forms the solid foundation of the natural sciences.
Two forms of abstraction govern the whole of this class of knowledge—viz., the determination of quantitative relations, according to number and magnitude; and relations of quality, embracing the specific properties of heterogeneous matter.
The first of these forms, more accessible to the exercise of thought, belongs to the domain of mathematics; the other, more difficult to seize, and apparently more mysterious, to that of chemistry. In order to submit phenomena to calculation, recourse is had to a hypothetical construction of matter by a combination of molecules and atoms whose number, form, position, and polarity determine, modify, and vary the phenomena.
We are yet very far from the time when a reasonable hope could be entertained of reducing all that is perceived by our senses to the unity of a single principle; but the partial solution of the problem—the tendency towards a general comprehension of the phenomena of the universe—does not the less continue to be the high and enduring aim of all natural investigation.